"In fear of death, in fear of rot"

It is said that the Prophet told his followers to die before they die. Are we in need of an existential euthanasia? In demanding this the act of Islam, the spiritual submission as understood in the worldly horizon evades the totality of it's temporal revelation. Sharia, the transmitted conditions of transcendental return is mortal after all, it's rulings are constrained by the metaphysical composition of Dunya (what need would we have for return if the oppositions between departure and arrival no longer convey any ontological resonance), but as we consciously die as the Prophet suggested, we project onto a certain possibility which is of course paradoxically avoided in the condition of intentional undeath. Life in death, "حي فل موت". To die intentionally then, is it not a suicide or do the inter-sensory components of the imaginal hierarchy, the shadowy presencing of which we merely mirror as fickled ambivalence assume the determinant of our own martyrdom? And thus, do we avoid the ultimate hubris in appropriating the original function in commanding for ourselves the collapsing of the infinite horizon, through nothing but our own will? 

Is there nothing then, more terrifying in death? The rejuvenation towards the unveiling of the sub-conceit of an established revelation? Surely as Bram Stoker's Dracula would have it, there are far worse things in this world than death? Indeed how can fear what is not only the only certain possibility, but a desired archetypal condition. We have already inverted the projected fatal occurrence into the very condition of our fixation towards it. To fear this condition would only indicate a certain ethereal homelessness, having being hurled into the world and picked up oneself in horrified awareness of recycled time echoing behind him, and urging him onwards off a quickly approaching precipice. Treatment would require a determined yet effortless reorientation towards the finite, or the sacred life that lies on it's threshold. Is it this unknowable condition in the post-Dunya that resolutely defies the subjugation of human reasoning that deserves fearing?         

How can fear, however the ultimate reconciliatory process between initiation and releasement, aesthetic degeneration and horrific rejuvenation, word as idolic injunction and unhindered desire in a violently sanctioned commitment to the nobility of the un-self. The last principle, perhaps. The horizontal blade of the impetuous feminine royalty, refinement in the wilful erasing of boundaries, into sanctified butchery, imposing momentary inter-sensory clarity in gleeful blinding's. The blade raised vertical and inherited among the purified self-obliterated. The vigilant slave, their kohled eyes mirroring their mastery over the inter-perceptuary, the splendid symmetry of their physical form complementing the blade inherited. Unquestionably masculine in virtue though bound and worshiped through the royal birth-giver. This is the nature of the double tipped sword. It is perhaps truly impossible to rationalise the outwardly destination but not entirely in vain to glimpse in the duality of the sacred form. 

We are of course referring here to beauty. Beauty as the symbolic register of the articulation of truth, it's presence in the sensory realm. It is, not however an imitation by whose very nature is incapable of authentic admiration but a bridge unto which we gaze onto the other side and acknowledge the projected possibilities that lay beyond. Beauty is rarely a given though, but a mutilatory ideal. It's conditions must be carved through our moral and sensible boundaries. The void of the sacred light which saturates from within our exclusionary edifices are not, however fear inducing in the sense that we wish to consider here but more momentarily displacing.       

The only condition worthy of fear then should be rot. A Thrownness but not in this world but the after. In the jaded torment, the infinite tearing onto all of ones possibilities there is simply no connection to the past, nor is there a present in which to feel frustrated. One is frantically holding against the shattered threshold. Grounding Is and the conditions unto which one orients his existence in an unfathomable vacuum of anti-Is. Terrifyingly perform useless tricks to pass into an opening, only to be left dejected, confronted by ghosts of performers to which art he may recognise but that he may never see as anything other than an unrepentant elimination.                          
     

The value of traditionalist ethics

 

I’ve become rather obsessed with death recently. Not quite as a morbid musing, nor a lamenting reflection but more as a transcendental state; that is a threshold which recognises no division between truth and its allegorical transcriptions in the realm of perception.  That primordial drive of eternal return, to recognise the self in relation to the seemingly inanimate and to strike forth into the darkness in as every bit of freedom as a corpse. This sentiment is more or less present in most pre-modern cultures, but I’d like to draw attention to two particular cases; that of the Bushi warrior aristocracy of Japan and the deathly aesthetic present in Shia Islamic ethics. In the Hagakure (In the shadow of leaves), the classical of the Japanese warrior classes written by Yamamoto Tsunetomo, Samurai retainer turned Buddhist Monk; the freedom in death is stressed in the first chapter.

                “If by setting ones heart right every morning and evening, one is able to live as though his body is already dead, he gains freedom in the way. His whole life will be without blame and he will succeed in his calling”

Yet far from constituting a rejection of life; or a license for the glorification of misery, murder and morbidity, the deathly aesthetic is nothing more than the unification of the scattered relics of practical existence and the reorientation towards an authentic state. Tsunetomo explains;

                “We all want to live. And in large part we make our logic according to what we like. But not having attained our aim and continuing to live is cowardice. This is a thing dangerous line”

 

The way as death, or the affirmation of life?

An interesting method in which to interpret this seemingly nihilistic statement is perhaps in contrast to Nietzsche’s appeal to noble ethics as life affirming as opposed to the tempting solace found within medieval Christian values. The comparison is problematic given the formers explicit embracing of death and Nietzsche’s hatred of the idealised aesthetic but in negating the materially defined opposition between life and death, the two espouse a similar set of ideals. Nietzsche of course took issue with the slave ethic at the heart of western moralities obsessive need to relegate the cause of suffering to the sufferer himself. The process in which the individuals will is perverted into a regressive, self hating paradigm is in itself a great act of will, or as Tsunetomo might have put it “making our logic according to what we like”. Tsunemtomo’s “frivolous sophisticates” who dream up excuses for cowardice and Nietzsche’s priestly class who champion a perverted order may be seen as one in the same.

                 “One must pay dearly for immortality; one has to die several times while still alive”    

That isn’t to say however, that the Bushi conception of death is identical to the Greek-rooted idealised affirmation of life. The two are qualitatively separate, although both noble in character. The Bushi not only transcends the immediacy of his material existence in the embracing of a warrior morality but forcibly reorganises his existence towards an unknowable horizon rather than a philosophical ideal.

 

                “A real man does not think of victory or defeat. He plunges recklessly towards an irrational death. By doing this, you will awaken from your dreams”

I feel the Japanese gentlemanly ideal is in stark contrast to the western, not in the same sense as classical nobility is to secular mysticism but in its anti-philosophical outlook; and the rejection of binary oppositions, empirical reasoning or even the closest western equivalent of chivalric sentiments. Is there perhaps a middle ground between the Greek and Japanese tradition? I believe there is, and that it is most visible within the ethical discourse and Gnostic philosophy espoused by the first Shi’ite Imam, Ali Ibn Talib, which reflect both pre-Islamic notions of Futuwwa (chivalry) and a philosophical disposition towards a deathly aesthetic.     

Imam Ali's deathly aesthetic

            “Death is more intimate to me than the breast of a mother is to a suckling babe” Imam Ali

I’ve written before on Imam Ali’s philosophy in my Gothic-Ghulat manifesto, and so in the interest of not repeating myself, I’ll briefly summarise the interpretations behind these aesthetic sentiments. The death in this sense, is more explicitly esoteric and has more in conjunction with the Sufi ideal of self obliteration “Al Fana fi Ilah” (extinction in the divine), than the seemingly Bushi conception of death as utterly irrational but necessarily threshold. The two, however are relatable in their rejection of the unauthentic, whether the frivolous concern of the “sophisticate”, or the egotistical attachment to the world and the enslavement of the soul to realm of immediate perception. In Shia theology, there is a prevalent motif which states the believer must die before his death, to walk with one foot firmly in the grave thus partially awakening the sleeping divinity within ones Nafs (soul).

                “The world is an abode for which annihilation is ordained, and for its people departure from it is decreed”

Both discourses are concerned with the awakening of the soul, the setting sites on the horizon of death and in kierkegaardian terms, the recognition of the wholeness of existence in this mortal boundary. Imam Ali’s philosophical orientation towards death had much to do with his very classically Gnostic adoration of the universal intellect as the initial cosmic principle. This should not, however be understood in the post enlightenment sense of the intellect as the capability to logically deduce the real from sensory perception alone. Rather it was more in harmony with the Greek intellectus, which implies the capability to directly contemplate transcendental realities. Thus, the universal intellect is tied to the conception of the soul, which can become a battleground in the struggle towards the total orientation towards the real.

                “The ultimate battle is that of a man against his own soul,

                He who knows his soul, fights it”

 This is remarkably similar to the Bushi ideal of true victory as the victory over the self. Indeed, both the Bushi ideal and the teachings of the Imam stress kindness, restraint, mercy and good character but not for their own sake. Such actions are not of the altruism that the likes of Nietzsche despised, but a strict adherence to the tracedental real. This brings me to the point of this essay, to ascertain whether these values, of the warrior aristocracy are of any use in today’s world.

Rescuing noble values

There is little doubt that the modern world exists within the shadow of Kant. A messianic imperative to bring the world under a certain uniformity, one which upholds positivist logic. The needs to eliminate other alternatives to this vision lie at the heart of Kant’s perpetual peace theory. His successors, particularly John Rawls went on to have significant philosophical influence on American foreign policy, one that has been particularly damaging. This imperative triggers a neurotic need to crusade in the name of the ethics of pity; an unyielding adherence to the consciousness of the masses, and the establishment of eternal truths as justification for these actions. The sovereignty of man is abandoned as are noble ethics in favour of a moral fanaticism. The Bushi code acts as a check against this deontological principle;

 

                “To think that being righteous is the best one can do and to do one’s utmost to be righteous will, on the contrary, bring many mistakes. The way is in a higher place than righteousness.”

 

      Kant’s vision of perpetual peace, is a kind of Imperial morality in its totality, the obsessive need to reconstitute its broken core in the unification of its peripheral extremities, and the relegation of the noble individual to a mere recipient of reason. Nowhere in the aristocratic ideals of the Bushi or the Gnostic chivalry of the Imam can there exist a concept which rejects the sovereignty of man, or regulate a warrior to the realm of the homo sacer.  Indeed, a noble ethics requires the seeking out of similar characteristics in the enemy, necessitating a respect unheard of in modern times.

 

Chivalry

                “The knight of knowledge must be able not only to love his enemies, but also to hate his friends”

Returning to the theme of Gnostic chivalry, we see that Imam Ali was one known for his harshness towards his closest allies and respect towards his enemies, a characteristic which eventually cost him his life. At the battle of Siffin during the first Islamic civil war, the forces of Ali had largely overwhelmed the opposing forces led by Muawiyah who had rebelled against Ali’s appointment as Caliph following the murder of the third Caliph, Uthman. The conflict itself had it's origins in the divide between an practically minded Imperialising tendency championed by the pre-Islamic Arab old guard and the belief that the Caliphate must revert to a spiritual order given the non-Arab mawali converts to the religion. Muawiyah had built a support base in Syria and with their backing, refused to give the baya (oath of loyalty) to the new Caliph, forcing Ali into a military confrontation. On the eve of victory, however, Ali’s forces broke off their attack when Muawiyah ordered his troops to hoist Qur’an’s on spears with the message “Let god decide”. Despite personal reservations, Ali agreed to withdraw his forces and enter into negotiations, expecting his opponent to return the honourable gesture as was common in pre-Islamic warfare. Ali’s gallantry had not only spared the opposing force, but by recognising the autonomy of the Syrian elite severely hindered his ability to rule undisputed and without further incident. As we have seen though, Ali's philosophy was based on a noble ethics, guided by transcendental principles as opposed to lust for immediate material gains.        

This is perhaps the ethics that should be of value today; those decisively irrational, recognising the sovereignty in the enemy and fixated upon the unknowable horizon. As opposed to the Imperial philosophy of Kant, in it's totality and uniformity, a feudal or pre-Imperial ethic could be considered. An individualist path which stresses the romantic roots of the warrior aristocracy as a will to power in it's own right while at the same time, recognising the chivalrous potential not in the sense of righteousness for it's own sake, or in service of a ethics of pity but in eternal awareness of the boundless vision.

 

Why Nihilism is enough

Our generation is perhaps the first where it is expected and encouraged to be a revolutionary. The tired and inappropriate regurgitation of the supposed dichotomy between establishment and disestablishment is a misleading as that between left and right. Sub-culturally alternating teenage school girls, belching liberal newspaper executives, guilt ridden teenage Trotskyite and failed presidential candidates are all equal in the expectation that their lives should amount to reeling the chaotic forces in the universe under some sort of democratic harmony. The intellectually capable among us will be able to distinguish the mass appeal of some revolutionary goals over others. All but the most gullible know Kony 2012 was a scam. The horrendous marriage of commercial strategy, youth pop culture and post-Victorian ethics should be enough to make even the likes of Bob Geldof nauseous. The less serious the subject matter the more inappropriate the means of mobilisation are. When you’re dealing with niggers it becomes perfectly acceptable to quite literally offer pre-packaged revolutionary solutions, in standard, premium and deluxe means of delivery.



Supporters of the increased tendency of today’s youth to “think about the world”, will often acknowledge the potential for manipulation and opportunism of those who would use further their own geo-political agenda under the guise of altruistic motives, but will regulate such phenomena as the natural expected backlash against the previous all pervasiveness of  post-modern  cynicism. Its detractors such as Badiou and Zizek would challenge the assumption that such a movement represents a clear break from post-modernism at all, merely amounting to the reformulation of disparate failed phenomena, stripped of their contexts and revitalised in a shallow momentary aesthetic. I would not be so dismissive when considering the increasing optimistic (and misplaced) desire among today’s youth to save the world, especially in relation to a very real and conscious retaliation against the remnants of post-modernist ideals which have degenerated into the almost universally lamented hipster movement. Instead, I believe that the emergence of the likes of the “New Sincerity” movement represent nothing more than a militant revitalised positivism that potentially justifies unwarranted transgression against the individual, group and nation in the name of a poorly defined and deliberately simplified humanism.





A call to slavery: In the service of the invisible master   

 

Back in undergraduate Sociology, we were given a lamentable compulsory course on Social and Political enquiry which included a sizable portion on the call for a militant anthropology as a refreshing break from post structuralist cautionary discourses against the very dangerous game of imposing relative values on a subject deemed (on the whim of the researcher) to be anthropologically worth considering. It was interesting that the only justification for this break by the lecturer was that everyone was fed up with all this post-modern crap. Fatigue is a good enough reason as any to assume and experiment with a different strategy for approaching the social world but is it enough as the only reason? And more importantly, can it justify encouraging a potentially historically irresponsible attitude towards social research in general.



 The first thing one should make clear is that social scientists don’t set social trends, and any claim that it is the sociologists/philosophers/anthropologists mandate to change the world should be confronted. While the likes of Zizek rightfully point out the position of a philosopher as the modest interpreter, I don’t exactly believe it’s correct for the social scientist to merely jump on the bandwagon of already existing socially occurring phenomena (Wall street protests, Arab revolution) and speaking at political rallies while at the same time hiding behind the role of the modest observer.  It’s really no wonder than a philosopher of such an impenetrable school as Lacanian psychoanalysis is an international superstar among the student left. You can’t call yourself a communist, flirt with revolutionary movements, attend Marxism 2011 and then complain about misconceptions of the role of the philosopher. Infact, the danger in this fallacy was highlighted by none other than Martin Heidegger who despite (quite unfairly) being strongly associated with the political, refrained from any notion that it was the philosophers duty to bring about change in the world. In his critique of Marx’s famous praxis, “The Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point is to change it”, Heidegger points out that the call for any change in the world in predicated upon the change in the conception of the world. That is that Marx’s praxis is itself limited to his own interpretation of the world. As Zizek himself points out, “words matter, they matter because they define the contours of what we can do”. What remains modest then in appearing on Al-Jazeera during the Egyptian revolution with that modern embodiment of Islamic banality, Tariq Ramadan and rambling about a region you have little familiarity with?



I have to reaffirm that I’m not against non-experts from expressing their opinion on a region or topic they haven’t been awarded a stamp of approval by the university to dissect, what would be the point since it seems everyone is invited to the theoretical laboratory which houses the mangled, assaulted body of the Middle East. And I would argue there is definite value to Nietzsche’s distaste for the ant-like scholars who are devoid of the lightness in touch and the freedom of spirit in regarding things. But Zizek is moving beyond merely regarding things! Is there not a point when an actively partisan stance betrays the (admittedly post-structuralist) philosophical imperative to read and interpret?    



While social scientists don’t set trends, they have the potential to give an activity a stamp of intellectual approval. Beginning with Nancy Schepur-Hughes and her self-righteous crusade against the injustices she would unravel, there has been a trend for academics to engage in popular activism with little concern for the inferred values unquestionably taken to heart is always existing universal truths, to be imposed on the subjects of academia (and beyond) by pen (and by any logical conclusion, sword). Unlike Erving Goffman’s far more subtle, cynical (a key term in today’s account for the fatigue people have with post-modernism) account of psychiatric institutions in the 1950s, the likes of Hughes abandons the fortress of responsibility and allows herself to be consumed by a movement that respects no distinction between the roles that such a position affords. And like those people who take it upon themselves to save the world, the intellectual quite literally becomes unable to save him/herself. In this very Nietzschean sense, the crusading intellectual and activist is as oppressed as his/her beloved other, utterly imitable and devoid of self.